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Abstract. Power analysis presents the typical example
of successful attacks against trusted cryptographic devices
such as RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentifications) and contact
smart cards. In recent years, the cryptographic community
has explored new approaches in power analysis based on
machine learning models such as Support Vector Machine
(SVM), RF (Random Forest) and Multi-Layer Perceptron
(MLP). In this paper, we made an extensive comparison of
machine learning algorithms in the power analysis. For this
purpose, we implemented a verification program that always
chooses the optimal settings of individual machine learning
models in order to obtain the best classification accuracy. In
our research, we used three datasets, the first contains the
power traces of an unprotected AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard) implementation. The second and third datasets
are created independently from public available power traces
corresponding to a masked AES implementation (DPA Con-
test v4). The obtained results revealed some interesting facts,
namely, an elementary k-NN (k-Nearest Neighbors) algo-
rithm, which has not been commonly used in power analysis
yet, shows great application potential in practice.
Keywords
Power analysis, machine learning, template attack, com-
parison, smart cards
1. Introduction
Power analysis (PA) measures and analyzes the power
consumption of cryptographic devices depending on their ac-
tivity. The main goal of PA is to determine the sensitive infor-
mation from the power consumption measured and to apply
the information obtained in order to abuse the cryptographic
device. There are two basic methods of power analysis: sim-
ple and differential. Simple power analysis (SPA) tries to
determine the sensitive information (mostly encryption key
that is stored in the device) more or less directly from one
power traces measured. A typical example of the SPA is the
attack aimed on the implementation of the asymmetric cryp-
tographic algorithm RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman), where
the differences in power consumption revels private key [1]
(implementation of Square and multiply algorithm). The
goal of differential power analysis (DPA) attacks is to reveal
the secret key of the cryptographic device based on a large
number of the power traces that have been recorded while the
device was encrypting various input data. The basic principle
of DPA was introduced on DES (Data Encryption Standard)
algorithm using the statistical method based on Difference of
Means [2]. A general description of PA attacks is presented
in [3], [4].
From a different perspective, we can divide the power
analysis attacks into two main categories, namely profiling
and non-profiling attacks. In profiling attacks, an adversary
needs a physical access to a pair of identical (similar) devices
that we call a profiling device and a target device. Basi-
cally, these attacks consist of two phases (profiling and attack
phase). In the first phase, the adversary analyzes the profil-
ing device in order to approximate the leakage behavior and
in the second phase, the adversary attacks the target device.
Typical examples are the template-based attack (TA) [5], [6]
and Stochastic Approach (SA) [7], [8]. The practical aspects
of template attacks (TA) have been discussed in [9], [10]. The
profiling phase of TA was improved in [6], [11], [12]. Most
crucial step during these profiling attacks lies in selecting of
the interesting points. Various techniques are used to localize
interesting points that provide information about data pro-
cessed e.g. Normalized Inter-Class Variance (NICV) [13],
Sum Of Squared pairwise Differences (SOSD) [14], Sum
Of Squared pairwise T-differences (SOST) [14], Principal
Components Analysis (PCA) [11], [15] or Pearson Correla-
tion (CPA) [3]. By contrast, the non-profiling attacks are one-
phase attacks that perform the attack directly on the target de-
vice (it represents a more realistic scenario in practice). The
attacker measures a set of power traces for the known plain
text and compares these power traces with hypothetical power
consumption that was calculated based on every secret key
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hypotheses and on power consumption model [4], [16], [17].
Only the correct key hypothesis shows dependency of the
hypothetical power consumption calculated and the power
consumption measured. DPA based on the correlation co-
efficient and on Hamming weight power consumption mode
represents a typical example of non-profiled attacks that are
aimed on smart card implementations [3], [18].
In order to prevent power analysis attacks, one can im-
plement some of the countermeasure techniques. The goal
of every countermeasure is to create the power consump-
tion of a cryptographic device independent of intermediate
values that are currently processed. Generally the counter-
measure techniques are divided into two basic groups, hiding
and masking. In the masking approach, each intermediate
value is concealed by a random value that is called mask.
Various masking methods of the AES algorithm have been
already proposed [19–22]. By contrast, hiding tries to break
the link between the power consumption and the data values
processed [3]. It is clear, that the implementation of coun-
termeasures brings overhead in terms of memory and time
therefore researchers have started to look for the lightweight
possibilities. One of these lightweight countermeasures is
Rotating Sbox Masking that is a type of Low-Entropy Mask-
ing Scheme [23–25]. The main idea is based on the usage
of the precomputed table look-ups [26] and at the same time
the overhead is reducing by carefully choosing the limited
mask set [27]. This essentially allows to reuse S-boxes and
reduce the computation of mask compensation because only
16 possible masks are applied. The set of chosen mask can
be a public parameter however this set should be shifted by
a random offset before each encryption. We refer interested
readers to works [23], [25], [28] where more details of RSM
and its security analysis are provided. RSM has been stud-
ied by researchers worldwide under the framework of DPA
Contest V4 [29]. DPA Contest is an international framework
that allows researchers to compare their power analysis at-
tacks under the same conditions and is organized by Telecom
ParisTech French University.
To complete the introduction about power analysis, we
note that an adversary can bypass masking techniques using
several intermediate values to calculate hypothesis. These
types of attacks are called higher-order DPA attacks [30],
[31]. Higher-order DPA attacks exploit the joint leakage
of several intermediate values that occur inside the crypto-
graphic device. In the paper, we do not take this possibility
into account.
Machine learning (ML) as a scientific discipline ex-
plores the construction of algorithms that can improve their
performance based on previous experiences or trainings [32].
Most of the machine learning problems deal with the classi-
fication of various input data. In general, machine learning
approaches can be classified as supervised [33] and unsu-
pervised learning [34]. Intuitively, in supervised learning,
the machine is presented with a set of training data with the
label and the goal is to determine the general function that
associates the data with the label. In unsupervised learning,
the machine is presented with a set of unlabeled data, and the
machine tries to determine the hidden structure of the data.
From the description above, one can clearly see an anal-
ogy between machine learning approaches and power analy-
sis attacks. More specifically, profiling attacks are a super-
vised learning problem, where ML techniques are used for
a model creation of the target device. Generally, the model
created is based on the multivariate normal distribution in the
power analysis. This fact is based on the following simple
analysis of a power trace: one can analyze power consump-
tion measured by looking at a single point of a power trace
(we look at the power consumption of a cryptographic device
at a fixed moment of time). For this point, we can determine
the probability distribution that is dependent on the processed
data. Generally, it is difficult to make a statement about the
data dependency of the power consumption of cryptographic
devices. However, for most cryptographic devices, it is valid
to approximate the distribution of the data dependency of
the power consumption by a normal distribution. More-
over, power consumption of cryptographic devices is mostly
proportional to the Hamming weight1 or the Hamming dis-
tance2 of data processed. In these cases, the distribution is
composed of nine normal distributions with different mean
and the standard deviation is approximately the same. In
order to consider the correlation between more points in the
power trace, it is necessary to model a power trace measured
as a multivariate normal distribution which constitutes a gen-
eralization of the normal distribution to higher dimensions.
We refer the book [3] where authors realized the complete
analysis of statistical characteristics of power traces.
On the other hand, non-profiling attacks can be seen
as an unsupervised learning. Instead of statistical methods,
one can apply ML in order to find the desired structures in
the data. In this paper, we do not take into account this
application of ML.
1.1 Related Work
In the field of power analysis, the possibility of using
neural networks was first published in [35]. Naturally, this
work was followed by the other authors, e.g. [36], who dealt
with the classification of individual power prints. These
works are mostly oriented towards reverse engineering based
on power print classification. Yang et al. [37] proposed MLP
in order to create a power consumption model of a crypto-
graphic device in CPA. Lerman et al. [38], [39] compared
a template attack with a binary machine learning approach,
based on non-parametric methods.
Hospodar et al. [40], [41] analyzed the SVM on a soft-
ware implementation of a block cipher. Heuser et al. [42]
1Typical for smart cards.
2Typical for micro controllers.
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created the general description of the SVM attack and com-
pared this approach with the template attack. In 2013, Bartke-
witz [43] applied a multi-class machine learning model which
improves the attack success rate with respect to the binary
approach. Moreover, they used (linear) SVM as a preprocess-
ing tool for feature selection, similar as Brank [44]. Recently,
Lerman et al. [45] proposed a machine learning approach that
takes into account the temporal dependencies between power
values. This method improves the success rate of an attack
in a low signal-to-noise ratio with respect to classification
methods. Another SVM-based attack was presented in [46]
where the authors used SVM to recover the secret key (bit by
bit) by exploiting the leakage in the key permutation round.
Lerman et al. [47] presented a machine learning at-
tack against a masking countermeasure, using the dataset of
the DPA Contest v4. The method of power analysis based
on a multi-layer perceptron was first presented in [48]. In
this work, the authors used a neural network directly for
the classification of the AES secret key. In [49], this MLP
approach was optimized by using the preprocessing of the
power traces measured. Lerman et al. [50] introduced semi-
supervised a Template Attack, that combines supervised and
unsupervised learning. The method was confirmed by the
experiments on an 8-bit microcontroller and by a compar-
ison to a template attack. The authors proposed an unsu-
pervised learning approach for PA in [51] aimed on DES
algorithm. Heyszlet et al. [52] introduced unsupervised clus-
ter classification algorithm k-means to attack cryptographic
exponentiation of public key cryptographic system and re-
cover secret exponents without any prior profiling. Note that
the algorithm k-means should not be confused with k-nearest
neighbor algorithm. Zhanget et al. [53] proposed DPA attack
based on the correlation coefficient using Genetic Algorithm.
Perin et al. [54] presented the attack based on clustering al-
gorithm that attacks the randomized exponentiation of RSA
algorithm. In work [55], the k-NN algorithm was briefly
mentioned as a possible mutual information estimator.
At the end of 2014, Dirmanto realized a small but con-
cise overview of machine learning approaches in power anal-
ysis [56]. The survey paper summarizes the main theoretical
aspects [56]. During the CHES 2015 conference, Whitnall
presented unsupervised clustering algorithm (K-means clus-
tering) in order to recover nominal power model [57]. The
model was used to key recovery attack, with minimal require-
ments in the profiling phase and moreover the approach was
effective and robust across an extensive set of distortions.
1.2 Contribution
In previous works, individual machine learning (ML)
approaches are compared mostly with the template attack or
the stochastic attack (SA) [40], [41]. ML approaches have
not been compared yet. The work [47] can be mentioned as
an exception, where SVM and RF are compared with the TA
and the SA. In this article, we try to make an extensive com-
parison of machine learning algorithms in PA. We focus only
on the usage of the individual ML algorithms in profiling
attacks where ML techniques are used for a model creation
of the target device. We do not consider other possible appli-
cation such as structure searching, preprocessing or feature
selection.
For our research, we implemented a verification pro-
gram that always chooses the optimal settings of the indi-
vidual ML models in order to obtain the best classification
accuracy. Our research was based on three datasets, the first
dataset containing the power traces of an unprotected AES
implementation where we classify one byte of the secret key.
The second and third datasets were independently prepared
from public datasets of power traces corresponding to the
masked AES implementation (DPA Contest v4 [29]) where
we classify the secret offset. We decided to use the first order
success rate as a metric of the comparison because our two
datasets were focused on mask classification and Guessing
entropy is not suitable in this case3. Furthermore, we com-
pared every ML approaches with template based attack. In
this research, we wanted to answer particularly these ques-
tions:
• Which ML algorithm is the most suitable for profiling
PA attacks?
• Are there any generally appropriate settings of the ML
algorithms that can be used by the potential attacker for
PA attacks?
• How big is the influence of the number of power traces
and interesting points on the classification results of
individual ML algorithms?
Nowadays, the method using the SVM is considered to
be the most effective from machine learning algorithms in the
power analysis. In many concrete attacks, in which an ad-
versary has only a limited number of power traces available,
the SVM is better in comparison with the classical template
attack or the stochastic attack. Based on the results obtained,
we propose a power analysis method based on the k-NN
algorithm as the most effective method. Even there is no
“intelligence”, the algorithm shows great application poten-
tial in PA, because the usage of the algorithm provides some
advantages for the attacker in comparison with the other ma-
chine learning approaches and classic power analysis attack.
Moreover, we describe the general scheme of this method in
profiling power analysis attacks.
3It is usually more suitable to use Guessing Entropy as a metric to compare different key recovery side-channel attack implementations [58], but we
focused on offset revelation using two datasets and on secret key recovery using one dataset. Therefore we used a confusion matrix and success rate, which
is also often used during profiling PA attacks [59].
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2. k-Nearest Neighbors
In the previous section, we have already provided rele-
vant references that deal with the well-known ML approaches
in power analysis attack (such as SVM, MLP and RF). There-
fore, the following text focuses only on the description of the
approach proposed based on k-NN algorithm. We provide
the general scheme of this method in profiling power analysis
attacks.
Preliminaries: a learning set Y (sometimes denoted as
a training set) and a test set X with n and m instance rep-
resents power traces measured in the context of the power
analysis. Each instance yi where i = 1, . . . , n and x j
where j = 1, . . . ,m in the learning and training set con-
tains one assignment (a class label that determines which
class the concrete instant belongs to) and several attributes
yi = y1, . . . , yN , x j = x1, . . . , xN (features or observed vari-
ables). These attributes represent the interesting points of
power traces in time (samples). The learning set is used in
the profiling phase of the profiled attack and the test set is
used during the attack phase. In profiling power analysis
attack, the label represents the desired byte value of secret
key i.e. together 256 possible variants (0 to 255). From the
perspective of ML, we can see this problem as multiclass clas-
sification where ML classifies the instance into 256 possible
classes. The second method that is often used is to transfer
this problem into the multi-label classification. The multi-
label classification represents the problem of finding a model
that maps inputs x j to binary output vectors yi . There are
two main methods for tackling the multi-label classification
problem: problem transformation methods and algorithm
adaptation methods [46], [60], [61]. Problem transformation
methods transform the multi-label problem into a set of bi-
nary classification (two classes 0 or 1) that can be realized by
single-class classifiers (such as binary relevance or label pow-
erset). Algorithm adaptation methods adapt the algorithms to
directly perform multi-label classification (Multilabel Neural
Networks).
In machine learning, the k-Nearest Neighbors algorithm
is a non-parametric method used for classification and be-
longs to the simplest machine learning algorithms [62]. The
training phase of the algorithm consists only of storing the
learning set into the memory. In the classification phase, k is
a user-defined constant (typically small), and a point of the
test set is classified by assigning the label which is most fre-
quent among the k training samples nearest to that classified
point. If k = 1, then the object is simply assigned to the class
of that single nearest neighbor.
A typical example of k-NN classification is shown in
Fig. 1. The test sample denoted as a gray square should be
classified either to the first class of the white stars or to the
second class of the black circles. If the classification process
takes into account the three nearest points k = 3, the test
sample is assigned to the second class, because there are 2
stars and only 1 circle inside the selected area (solid line inner
circle). If k = 5, test sample is naturally assigned to the first
?
Fig. 1. Example of k-NN classification.
class because 3 black circles and 2 stars are in the selected
area (dashed line outer circle).
A commonly used distance metric for continuous vari-









|xi − yi | , Manhattan, (2)
where i represents a number of attributes in the learning
set. The overlap metric or Hamming distance are other pos-
sible metrics for discrete variables. The best choice of k,
that strongly depends on the learning set, is very important.
Generally, large k reduces the effect of the noise on the clas-
sification but makes the boundaries between the classes less
distinct. Suitable k can be selected by the various heuris-
tic techniques, for example the hyperparameter optimiza-
tion [63]. The following text describes the power analysis
method based on k-NN.
Profiling Phase
In the attack based on k-NN, we assume that we can
characterize the profiling device by labeling of measured
data. One can implement a certain part of the cryptographic
algorithm and execute the sequence of instructions on a pro-
filing device with different data di and different key values
k j , and record the power consumption. After measuring n
power traces, we create the matrix Yn that contains power
traces corresponding to the pair (di , k j ). According to the
key value, we add label in to the matrix Yn . In case of byte
classification, the label can be expressed by four columns
where every row represents a class using the binary expres-
sion 00000000 to 11111111 (every possible byte value from
0 to 255). The matrix Yn represents a learning set which is
stored into the memory.
Attack Phase
During the attack phase, the adversary uses the stored
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learning set together with the measured power trace from the
target device (denoted as t = [x1, . . . , xN ]) to determine the
secret key value. Let’s assume that for our k-NN algorithm
we chose the following parameters: k = 5 and Euclidean
distance. The classification takes three steps:
• at the beginning, the algorithm calculates Euclidean
distances of all stored training vectors yn to vector t:




(xi − yi )2. (3)
• In the second step, 5 closest training points are found
according to the distances calculated.
• In the last step, the class is selected based on the major-
ity vote.
The result of this classification is the most probable class
based on training set Y. Since each training instance yn is
associated with a secret key value, the adversary obtains the
information about the secret key stored in the target device.
Discussion of Simple Application of k-NN in Power
Analysis
In the following text, we provide a simple example of
the attack based on k-NN using the real data of power con-
sumption (we used only two dimension ie two interesting
points were selected) in order to demonstrate the suitability
and simplicity of approach proposed.
Let’s assume that the adversary wants to determine a
Hamming Weight (HW) of processing data or secret key
value. During the profiling phase, the adversary measures
2 560 power traces, 10 for every byte value (it means that 10
power traces corresponding to the HW = 0, 80 power traces
corresponding to the HW = 1 and so on). In power traces,
the adversary chooses two interesting points that leak infor-
mation about HW. The profiling phase is finished by storing
the points into the memory of a computer. Figure 2 shows
scatter plot of two chosen interesting points. The division of
two dimensional space into nine groups according to the HW
is clearly visible. We can approximate this data dependency
of the power consumption by a two variable normal distribu-
tion (we refer interested readers to consult statistical analysis
with book [3]). In these cases, the distribution is composed
of nine normal distributions.
In the attack phase, the adversary measures power trace
from the target device and puts same interesting points to the
k-NN algorithm. Figure 3 shows the process of classification
for unknown point that is marked with a black star and for
parameter k = 5. All five nearest neighbors points belong to
the distribution marked with blue color that corresponding to
the HW= 0. The adversary obtains the desired information
that the HW of processed data is 0. Similarly, the adversary
can continue with additional power traces in order to reveal
desire sensitive information.
Fig. 2. Scatter plot of two interesting points that leak HW.
Fig. 3. Detail of scatter plot.
It is obvious, if we focus on two points of the power
consumption at fixed time in our example, and realize mea-
surement of power consumption repetitively for constant data
than points measured will appear more or less on the same are
(group). Similar situation occurs for different data proceed
by cryptographic device therefore the points are in clusters.
Widely known fact is that k-NN algorithm is one of many al-
gorithms that is robust, simple and suitable for classification
problem. Using this simple example, we wanted to demon-
strate the classification problem during the power analysis
attacks and simple application of ML algorithms.
3. Settings of Experiments
The following text summarizes the most important facts
about the experimental setup and the verification program
(implemented attacks). We created three datasets in order to
test chosen machine learning approaches. Based on the state
of the art, we chose SVM, MLP, k-NN, DT (Decision trees),
RF and LDA (Linear Discriminant Analysis).
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Fig. 4. Example of power traces selected for DS1.
Fig. 5. Characteristics of DS1.
The first dataset (DS1) is focused only on the first byte
classification of the secret key. Dataset is prepared from
power traces of unprotected AES-128 implementation in our
testbed. The cryptographic module was represented by the
PIC 8-bit micro controller, and for the power consumption
measurement we used the CT-6 current probe and the Tek-
tronix DPO-4032 digital oscilloscope. We used standard
operating conditions with 5 V power supply. Stored power
traces had 100 000 of samples and covered the AddRoundKey
and SubBytes operations in the initialization phase of the al-
gorithm. Our implementation was realized in the assembly
language and the executed instruction of examined operation
were exactly the same for every key byte (identical power
prints). Therefore it was possible to use the place, where
the first byte is processed, in order to create a model with
which it was possible to determine the whole secret key byte
by byte. We verified this assumption experimentally and
it is naturally conditioned by the excellent synchronization
of measured power traces. Finally, we chose 5 interesting
points based on standard CPA method (note, we used well
know CPA method to localize interesting points in our whole
research). Every of our chosen interesting points leaked
information about Hamming weight of the processed data.
Fig. 6. Example of power traces selected for DS2.
Fig. 7. Characteristics of DS2.
We chose points that had a distance at least one clock cycle
from each other. This restriction for having IP not too close
avoids the numerical problems when inverting the covariance
matrix during the template based attack.
An example of power traces selected are depicted in
Fig. 4. Overall characteristics of IP selected are depicted in
Fig. 5 using the box plot. On each box, the central mark is
the median, the edges of the box are the 25th and 75th per-
centiles, the whiskers extend to the most extreme data points
not considered outliers, and outliers are plotted individually.
It can be observed that the first dataset does not include almost
any noise. Consequently, our first dataset represents a matrix
2 560 × 13 where the last 8 values are labels. Each label is
expressed by four columns where every row represents a class
using the binary expression from 00000000 to 11111111.
The second dataset (DS2) is focused on the mask clas-
sification and consists of 1 000 power traces. DS2 is prepared
from electromagnetic traces that are freely available on the
website of DPA Contest v4 [29]. The masked block-cipher
AES-256 in encryption mode without any mode of opera-
tion is implemented on target cryptographic device Atmel
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Fig. 8. Example of power traces selected for DS3.
Fig. 9. Characteristics of DS3.
ATMega-163-based smart card. The implemented masking
scheme is a variant of the Rotating Sbox Masking [23], [64].
According to the authors, this masking scheme keeps perfor-
mance and complexity close to the unprotected scheme and
is resistant to several side-channel attacks. Sixteen masks are
public information that are incorporated in the computation
of the algorithm. offset value, which is drawn randomly at
the beginning of computation, is a secret value. Mask values
are rotating according to the offset value [23], [64]. Each
stored trace has 435 002 samples associated to the same se-
cret key and corresponds to the first and to the beginning of
the second round of AES algorithm. For DS2, we chose only
the points that are the most correlated with the secret offset
value.
We realized classical CPA for operation Plaintext
blinding dependent on offset value in order to locate the
interesting points. We chose the 3 highest correlated points
for every mask value, together 48 interesting points were se-
lected. In other words, DS2 represents a matrix 1 000 × 52
where the last four values are labels. In our case, the la-
bel value corresponds with the offset value 0 to 15 (sixteen
possible variants). An example of power traces selected are
depicted in Fig. 6. The overall characteristics of the inter-
esting points selected are depicted in Fig. 7 using the box
plot.
The third dataset (DS3) was created by Liran Lerman
during preparation of the attack in DPA Contest v4 [47].
This DS is focused on the mask classification and we used
first 1 000 traces of 1 500 available. The author chose 50
interesting points according to the computed Pearson cor-
relation between each instance of 1 500 traces and the offset
value. In other words, our DS3 represents a matrix 1 000×54
where the last four values are labels. Again, the label value
corresponds with the offset value 0 to 15 (sixteen possible
variants). We refer the work [47] for more information about
the original dataset. An example of power traces selected is
depicted in Fig. 8. The overall characteristics of interesting
points selected are depicted in Fig. 9.
A well known fact is that noise always poses the problem
during the power consumption measurement. Every stored
power trace from DS1 was calculated as an average power
trace from ten power traces measured using the digital oscil-
loscope to reduce electronic noise. We refer the website [29]
to consult level of noise in DS2 and DS3.
3.1 Implemented Program
Figure 10 shows the main principle of the verification
algorithm implemented4. The main part of the implemented
program is the block denoted as Optimize Parameters This
block finds the optimal values of the selected parameters for
the tested machine learning algorithms. In other words, it
executes each model for all combinations of user selected
values of the parameters and then delivers the optimal pa-
rameter values as a result. Selected specific parameters are
described in more details in the next section. The second im-
portant block of the program is the Cross-validation. Cross-
validation (CV) is a standard statistical method to estimate
the generalization error of a predictive model. In l-fold cross-
validation, a training set is divided into l equal-sized subsets.
Then a model is trained using the other (l − 1) subsets and its
performance is evaluated on the current subset. This proce-
dure is repeated for each subset. In other words, each subset
is used for testing exactly once. The result of the cross-
validation is the average of the performances obtained from
l rounds.
In our verification program, we used typical 10-fold
cross-validation. We repeated CV four or eight times in the
Loop, because we created four or eight models for individual
bit classification depending on the dataset. In other words,
in our program we chose the multi-label classification where
a model maps inputs x j to binary outputs vectors yi using
single-class classifiers. The verification program returned
two output values: the best parameters for learning models
and the obtained accuracy using these parameters. The ac-
curacy was described using the typical confusion matrix.
4We use Rapid Miner for implementation [65].
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Fig. 10. Block scheme of our testing program.
The original implemented program contained the block
called Forward selection that selected individual attributes
of DSs. In each round, this block can add attribute and
the performance is estimated using the inner operators, e.g.
a cross-validation. This configuration allows us to get the
best result of machine learning algorithms depending on in-
dividual parameters setting and attributes selected. In this
way, we tested the influence of number and the combination
of selected attributes on the classification results.
3.2 Selected Parameters
It is obvious, that time required to solve the program
implemented strongly depends on the number of selected
parameters of individual ML approaches. One can test an
infinite number of parameters in theory, but it has no sense
in practice. For example, it is really unnecessary to test k-
NN algorithm for k > 11, because the results are worse and
the advantages of the algorithm are reduced (based on long
years practical experience with ML approaches). For these
reasons, we chose only limited number of parameters that are
relevant and important for testing individual ML algorithms.
Selection of parameters was realized based on our experience
and knowledge with ML.
In order to test SVM approach, we chose the complex-
ity parameter from 0 to 50, epsilon from 0.1 to 1 and type
of kernel radial, linear, polynomial, together it was 3 333 of
combinations. We selected three parameters: the depth from
1 to 100, the confidence from 1.0 e−7 to 0.5 and criterion
set to gain ratio, information gain, gini index and accuracy
(484 combination) to test decision trees (DT). The MLP ap-
proach was tested by the following parameters: one hidden
layer, type of the activation function, a number of training
cycle from 1 to 1 000, learning rate, neural network mo-
mentum both from 0 to 1 and normalization true or false
(5 324 combinations). During the testing of the k-NN al-
gorithm, we selected different types of metrics: Euclidean,
Camberra, Manhattan and Chebychev distance, Correlation,
Cosine, Dice, MaxProduct, Overlap and Jaccard similarity,
parameter k = 1, 3, ..., 11 and weighted vote (true or false).
Together, only 132 of combinations were tested. Testing of
Random forest (RF) model involved the parameters: the
depth from 1 to 100, the confidence 1.0 e−7 to 0.5, criterion
set to gain ratio, information gain, gini index and accuracy
and last parameter was a number of trees from 1 to 500 (5 324
combinations). As a last tested machine learning algorithm,
we involved linear discriminant analysis LDA in default set-
ting.
In order to complete our comparison, we implemented
the classical Template attack. We were interested in com-
parison of effective template attack based on pooled covari-
ance matrix [6], therefore we calculated the pool covariance
matrix as an average value of all covariance matrices and
we calculated the probability density function (equation (4))
with this matrix. Implementations of template attacks were
done according to the equation (4):
p(t; (m,C)di,k j ) =
exp(− 12 · (t −m)′ · C−1 · (t −m))√
(2 · π)NI · det(C)
(4)
where (m,C) represents templates prepared in profiling
phase based on multivariate normal distribution that is fully
defined by a mean vector and a covariance matrix. Measured
power trace from the target device is denoted as t and NI is the
number of interesting points. In the following text, classical
template and template attack based on the pooled covariance
matrix are denoted as Tcls and Tpool sequentially. In the first
experiment, we did not include a reduced template attack,
because if the adversary does not consider the covariance
matrix, he loses information about the relationship between
the interesting points. All template attack implementations
were realized in the Matlab environment.
4. Results Evaluation
The implemented program provided two outputs: ac-
curacy and best parameters selected for individual ML al-
gorithm. In order to calculate accuracy, it was used a typi-
cal confusion matrix. Interested readers can consult [66] to
obtain additional explanations about performance measure-
ments for classification, e.g. confusion matrix, precision, re-
call. Examples of confusion matrices of DS1 classification
for SVM-rbf and k-NN algorithm are shown in Tabs. 1 and 2.
In the confusion matrix, accuracy is the arithmetic mean of
the accuracy obtained from the 8 × 10 cross-validation for
individual models. The σ value represents their standard de-
viation. The value denoted as mikro is actually the accuracy
computed from the confusion matrix. In other words, it is
the success rate calculated for all of the 20 480 experiments
carried out in DS1. It is not possible to present every ob-
tained confusion matrices in this paper, therefore we present
the results based on mikro value of success rate.
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Accuracy: 96.15 % σ= 4.45 %
mikro: 94.38 %
bit value: 0 1
pred. 0: 9 640 551
pred. 1: 600 9 689
Tab. 1. Example of confusion matrix for SVM-rbf based on DS1,
parameters selected: rbf kernel, C=50, epsilon 0.46.
Accuracy: 99.58 % σ= 0.63 %
mikro: 99.20 %
bit value: 0 1
pred. 0: 10 161 (TN) 84 (FN)
pred. 1: 79 (FP) 10 156 (TP)
Tab. 2. Example of confusion matrix for k-NN based on DS1,
parameters selected: Euclidian distance, weighted vote
false and k=5.
In our first experiment, we verified that the influence of
the block Forward selection on resulting success rate is very
low. It is clear, if the selection of interesting points is done
in a correct way, the algorithm chooses always maximum
of attributes. This conclusion is natural and not surprising,
because selection of the interesting points from power traces
is crucially important during the profiled attacks, and we
used well know and verified CPA method in order to localize
interesting points during dataset preparation. Based on the
results obtained, we skipped this block and always chose the
maximum of attributes in the following experiments.
In the second experiment, we were searching for the
best success rate corresponding with the parameters of se-
lected machine learning algorithm on our three datasets. In
this way, we got the best possible success rate for machine
learning algorithm and we could compare machine learning
algorithms according to the highest value. Table 3 summa-
rizes the success rate obtained in percentage. The penulti-
mate rows provide the average value of the success rate cal-
culated from three values obtained and the last rows provide
the differences between average value and maximal obtained
average value.
From the results, one can confirm that differences be-
tween optimized ML algorithms are negligible. Note, that
the SVM with the rbf kernel had the best success rate of all
SVM kernels for all datasets. The algorithm k-NN classified
the DS1 with the highest success rate from all ML tested
(DS1 has the lowest value of noise). The SVM-rbf was the
best ML classifier of the DS2 and the DS3. Generally, the
template attack based on the pooled covariance matrix5 was
the best in average success rate based on all tested datasets,
but if we focus on the ML, the SVM-rbf together with k-NN
were the best with almost the same success rate. The dif-
ference was only 0.45 % and we can consider the difference
negligible taking into account the number of the experiments
(together 28 480 of individual bit classification). MLP was
the third best algorithm with only 0.57 % difference from
SVM-rbf. We can conclude that the SVM-rbf, MLP and
k-NN are the most suitable candidates for profiling power
analysis attacks.
k-NN SVM SVM SVM DT
linear rbf poly
DS1 99.20 85.57 94.38 86.93 94.10
DS2 97.65 92.65 99.02 97.92 83.00
DS3 88.05 89.50 92.95 90.12 79.85
φ 94.97 89.24 95.45 91.66 85.65
Δ 0.64 6.37 0.16 3.95 9.96
RF MLP LDA Tcls Tpool
DS1 90.24 93.52 85.17 98.44 98.83
DS2 85.48 98.92 93.08 95.60 99.60
DS3 74.95 92.20 89.45 47.00 88.40
φ 83.56 94.88 89.23 80.35 95.61
Δ 12.05 0.73 6.38 15.26 0.00
Tab. 3. The highest possible success rate of tested ML algo-
rithms [%].
The following text summarizes the parameters selected
of individual machine learning algorithms during the second
experiment.
Parameters selected for DS1:
• MLP: training cycle 475, momentum 0.0, learning rate
0.4, normalization true.
• SVM-linear: C=0.5, epsilon 0.001.
• SVM-rbf: C=50, epsilon 0.46.
• SVM-poly: C=2.5, epsilon 0.46.
• k-NN: k = 5, weighted vote false, Euclidian distance.
• DT: maximal depth 39, confidence 1.0 e−7, no pruning
true, criterion gini index.
• RF: number of trees 300, maximal depth 29, criterion
gini index.
Parameters selected for DS2:
• MLP: training cycle 720, momentum 0.0, learning rate
0.3, normalization true.
• SVM-linear: C=17.5, epsilon 0.82.
• SVM-rbf: C=45.0, epsilon 0.28.
• SVM-poly: C=12.5, epsilon 0.28.
• k-NN: k = 5, weighted vote false, numerical measure
OverlapSimilarity, kernel type multiquadric.
• DT: maximal depth 31, confidence 0.4, no pruning true,
criterion gini index.
• RF: number of trees 500, maximal depth 70, criterion
gini index.
Parameters selected for DS3:
• MLP: training cycle 640, momentum 0.6, learning rate
0.3, normalization true.
• SVM-linear: C=7.5, epsilon 0.91.
5Results of template based attack are informative, because template attacks were aimed at the whole byte classification.
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• SVM-rbf: C=45.0, epsilon 0.28.
• SVM-poly: C=4.0, epsilon 0.37.
• k-NN: k = 5, weighted vote false, numerical measure
OverlapSimilarity, kernel type multiquadric.
• DT: maximal depth 71, confidence 0.05, no pruning
false, criterion gini index.
• RF: number of trees 500, maximal depth 29, criterion
gini index.
We can recognize some similarities of the parameters
selected. Definitely, good choices for an attacker can be
either MLP with one hidden layer and normalization true,
SVM-rbf with the parameters C = 45 and epsilon 0.28 or we
suggest the k-NN with k = 5 and Euclidian distance.
Practically, we can optimize every ML algorithm (using
individual parameter settings) to get almost the identical clas-
sification results. The biggest difference between the tested
algorithms lies in the required time that is needed to find
the best setting of the concrete ML algorithm. For exam-
ple, finding the best parameters of the SVM algorithm with
poly kernel takes approximately eight days using parameters
selected and the DS1. The difference is enormous in com-
parison with 6 minutes and 35 seconds that was necessary
for k-NN optimization for the same DS1. In order to demon-
strate this feature, Tab. 4 summarizes the time consumption
of one executed 10-cross validation for implemented ML al-
gorithms.
The time required to calculate one 10-cross validation
for k-NN was less than 1 s and 320 s for SVM-rbf. Naturally,
the attacker has to calculate so many numbers of CV as the
number of the tested parameters, therefore the time needed is
directly proportional to the number of the tested parameters
and learning time. In our case, we tested only 132 combina-
tions of the parameters for k-NN, but 1 111 combination for
SVM with poly kernel. The algorithm k-NN is really easy,
therefore it is not necessary to test many parameters and the
algorithm does not include learning phase. These are the
main reasons why in terms of time consumption, the k-NN
algorithm provides the best performance in our implementa-
tion6.
Our fourth experiment examines the classification suc-
cess rate based on the number of power traces. For this
purpose, we prepared new datasets from the original three
DSs that differed in the number of power traces. From the
first DS1, we created 10 datasets each containing one power
trace more successively that corresponds to each key value.
In other words, datasets created have from 256 to 2 560 of
power traces with step 256. From DS2 and DS3, we created
again 10 datasets containing sequentially 100 to 1 000 power
traces with step 100. Data prepared were classified succes-
sively using the implemented program. The obtained results
are depicted in Figs. 11, 12 and 13.
k-NN SVM SVM SVM DT
linear rbf poly
DS1 0.2 185 320 2 075 18
DS2 0.3 45 4 4 20
DS3 0.3 10 12 315 26
RF MLP LDA Tcls Tpool
DS1 5 750 320 1 530 530
DS2 890 275 1 30 30
DS3 750 90 1 27 27
Tab. 4. Time consumption of 10-cross validation [s].
Fig. 11. Classification results DS1.
Fig. 12. Classification results DS2.
Fig. 13. Classification results DS3.
6Note, that our test was performed on datasets containing 1 000 and 2 560 of power traces.
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Fig. 14. Success rate of the secret offset revelation based on 100
power traces of DS2.
Fig. 15. Success rate of the secret offset revelation based on 250
power traces of DS2.
Displayed graphs confirm the theoretical assumption of
the increasing success rate with the increasing number of
power traces in profiling phase. The success rate is precip-
itously increasing until a maximal value and after that the
value of the success rate stays almost constant. An inter-
esting fact is that the number of power traces required to
achieve the maximum value was comparable for every ML
algorithms (especially for the best three, SVM-rbf, MLP and
k-NN). Generally, about 500 power traces of DS1, 300 power
traces of DS2 and 200 power traces of DS2 were necessary to
achieve the maximal value. From a comparison of Fig. 12 and
Fig. 13, we can see the influence of choosing the interesting
points because these DSs were prepared based on identical
power traces and aimed on the secret offset classification (in
other words, datasets differ only in method of selecting inter-
esting points). The shift of the maximum success rate values
around 10 % is obvious. During the DS3 classification, the
classical template attack provides really low values of calcu-
lated probabilities, therefore the first order success rate was
worse when compared with other approaches.
In our fifth experiment, we investigate a success rate of
the masks revelation depending on the number of interesting
Fig. 16. Success rate of the secret offset revelation based on 500
power traces of DS2.
Fig. 17. Success rate of the secret offset revelation based on 1 000
power traces of DS2.
points and the number of power traces. Moreover, we investi-
gate the influence of multiclass classification. In comparison
with our previous experiments, we modified the program in
such a way that ML classified instance to 256 classes (whole
byte classification). In other words, ML and TA classified
secret offset directly (not successively bit by bit). For this
purpose, we prepared datasets based on DS2 that differed in
the number of power traces and interesting points. We pre-
pared learning sets that contain 100, 250, 500 and 1 000 of
power traces successively and a test set that contains 1 500
instances in order to test profiling attacks. Figures 14, 15, 16
and 17 report the success rate to predict the right offset value
as a function of the number of interesting points selected
for the best profiled attacks: SVM-rbf, NN, k-NN, Tcls and
Tpool. The experiments described in [48], [49] implemented
MLP approach in Matlab using Netlab. In order to extend
our research on testing different implementation, we involved
also the MLP approach implemented in Netlab [67] (denoted
MLP_Matlab) and we involved to this experiment reduced
template attack denoted as Tred. Reduced template attack is
calculated according the equation (4) but the covariance ma-
trix is equal to the identity matrix (reduced templates contain
only the mean vector).
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Fig. 18. ROC analysis for individual bits of DS2.
Fig. 19. ROC analysis for individual bits of DS3.
One can extract the following observations. First, as
expected, the higher the number of traces in the learning set,
the higher the accuracy. For example, maximal success rate
achieved was 70 % and 99 % for learning set containing 100
and 1 000 power traces successively. Second, the number
of the selected points in each trace influences the success
rate: the higher the number of interesting points, the higher
the success rate of every attack implementations. The main
finding is that the rise in success rate of the attacks based on
ML occurs much earlier than for every TA attack. We can
observe success rate of 72 % for the MLP and of 7 % for TAs
for 20 interesting points and 1 000 power traces.
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It is remarkable that if learning set is small (in our ex-
periment less than 1 000 of power traces), the classic template
attack is practically inapplicable. It provides the success rate
somewhere around 7 %. This is caused by the numerical
problems that are connected with covariance matrix. These
numerical problems occur during the inversion which needs
to be done in equation (4). In our case, the values calculated
were very small and that leads to bad classification results.
The obtained results confirmed that generally the ML
approach is much more effective profiling power analysis at-
tack in terms of small number of power traces and interesting
points. It is pretty surprising that the MLP_Matlab approach
is better in comparison with the second implementation. It is
caused by more precise settings. The fact is that the template
attack based on the pooled covariance matrix and the ML
approaches (NN and SVM) are practically the same for the
larger learning sets. The obtained success rates were 99.9 %
and 99.6 % for Tpool and MLP successively. Furthermore, the
results obtained confirmed that k-NN is more similar to clas-
sic template attack. The success rate lies between Tcls and
Tpool. This approach is much more efficient than the clas-
sic template attack for smaller datasets, on the other hand,
Tpool is better, because it takes into account the relation be-
tween the interesting points selected. In practice, the k-NN
approach corresponds with the reduced template attack, that
does not take the covariance matrix into account. Naturally,
we realized the same experiment for DS3 and we evaluated
the results obtained. Not surprisingly, the results were prac-
tically the same, therefore we did not include those in the
article.
In our last experiment, we performed ROC (Receiver
Operator Characteristic) analysis for the chosen profiled at-
tacks based on machine learning algorithms. This method is
commonly used in medical decision making, and in ML in
order to illustrate the performance of a binary classifier as
its discrimination threshold is varied [68]. Therefore ROC
graphs are useful to organize, select classifiers and visualize
their performance.
The results of accuracy for individual models are cal-
culated based on the confusion matrices (see section 4 and
example in Table 2 for k-NN). The numbers along the major
diagonal represent the correct decisions, and the numbers
off diagonal represent the errors, the confusion between the
various classes. In other words, each column of the table
corresponds to the correct values of the class (in our case
bit value 1 or 0) and each row corresponds to the predicted
values.
For the following analysis, we denote:
• True positive (TP): the model predicted bit value 1 and
the actual bit value was 1.
• False positive (FP): the model predicted 1 and the actual
value was 0.
• True negative (TN): the model predicted 0 and the actual
value was 0.
• False negative (FN): the model predicted 0 and the ac-
tual bit value was 1.










Generally, ROC graphs are two-dimensional graphs in
that sensitivity is plotted on the Y axis and 1 − specificity is
plotted on the X axis, therefore they depict relative tradeoffs
between benefits (TP) and costs (FP). It is well known that
the best possible prediction model would yield a point (0, 1)
in the upper left corner of the ROC space. This point is also
called a “perfect classification”, because it represents 100 %
sensitivity (no FN) and 100 % specificity (no FP). The perfect
classier produces a curve that runs vertically upwards from
the origin (0, 0) up to the point (0, 1) and from this point
horizontally to the right. A completely random guess (con-
sidering binary classification with the success rate of 50 %)
would give a line along a diagonal from the origin (0,0) to
the top right corner (1,1).
Based on previous results we involved MLP, SVM-rbf,
k-NN, DT and RF into the ROC analysis successively. We
implemented ML using optimal parameters that were discov-
ered using the second experiment (please consult in Section
4 - part of the second experiment). We calculated ROC based
on whole datasets prepared and 10-fold cross validation. The
results of ROC analysis corresponding with each bit classi-
fication of DS1 are depicted in Fig. 20 in Appendix. The
semitransparent areas indicate the standard deviation that re-
sults over the different cycles of 10-fold cross validation.
Solid line indicates the average result of cross validation per-
formed. It can be observed that some of the bits of the secret
key can be perfect distinguished. This group includes the first
bit, the third bit and the eighth bit. In these cases, each model
provides almost perfect classification. Moreover, the remain-
ing group of bits was also classified with high performance,
but the differences between ML models were more signif-
icant. It is remarkable that the ROC curve plot of k−NN
was the closest to the perfect classifier for each remaining
bit and the second best model was SVM-rbf. Model based
on k−NN provided perfect classification even though other
models not (classification of bit 4, 5, 6 and 7). On the other
hand, it was interesting that according the ROC comparison
MLP was the worst for DS1. Naturally, the observation cor-
responds with the results of the second experiment (please
consult this observation in Tab. 3). Based on our experi-
ments and experience with MLP in profiled power analysis
attack, we concluded that it is caused by a small number of
interesting points7.
7Since 2010, we have implemented mainly MLP approach instead of standard template attack in our profiling power analysis attacks that have conducted
in researches and DPA Contests.
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The results of ROC analysis corresponding with each
bit classification of DS2 are depicted in Fig. 18 and shows
that each 4 bits of secret offset were classified with great per-
formance. Based on ROC plots of k-NN, SVM-rbf and MLP,
it can be observed that these models are really close to the
perfect classification. The difference between these models
is really negligible for DS2.
ROC curves corresponding with each bit classification
of DS3 are depicted in Fig. 19. As in previous case, k-NN,
SVM-rbf and MLP provided the best plot in ROC space.
Moreover, the influence of the most crucial step of profiling
PA, that lies in selecting of the interesting points, is demon-
strated by comparing Fig. 18 and Fig. 19, because datasets
DS2 and DS3 were prepared from identical raw power traces.
In Fig. 19, the plot of ROC curves are more distant from (0,1),
therefore the selection was performed less precisely and the
model created provided lower performance. We conclude
that if selection of interesting points is properly performed,
every possible distinguisher will provide more or less sim-
ilar results regardless of the underlying technique deployed
(either classic templates or machine learning after optimiza-
tion).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we provided an extensive comparison of
widely used machine learning algorithms in power analy-
sis such as SVM, decision tree, MLP including the new
approach based on k-NN. We implemented a verification
program that chose optimal settings of the parameters of in-
dividual machine learning algorithms in order to obtain the
best classification accuracy. Based on the obtained results,
we can consider SVM-rbf, MLP and k-NN as the most suit-
able candidates for profiling power analysis attacks (in terms
of classification accuracy). Generally, we can optimize every
ML algorithm using parameter settings to get almost identi-
cal classification results. On the other hand, optimization of
individual ML algorithm can be time consuming (possible
difference can be enormous based on the selected parame-
ters and algorithm, for example 6 minutes and 35 seconds
was needed for k-NN optimization and 8 days for SVM-poly
optimization).
Moreover, we investigated a success rate of the masks
revelation depending on the number of the interesting points
and the number of power traces. As expected, the higher the
number of traces and points in the learning set, the higher
the accuracy of every power analysis attacks implemented.
The main finding was that the sharp rise in success rate of
the ML attacks (MLP and SVM) occurs much earlier than for
every TA attacks. We can conclude that the ML approach is
much more effective profiling power analysis attack in terms
of a small number of power traces and interesting points. In
other words, it is better to use profiling power analysis attack
based on the MLP if the adversary has only limited power
traces measured than to realize attack based on templates.
From every experiments realized, we see really good
potential in k-NN algorithm. The approach proposed based
on simplest k-NN algorithm can provide important advan-
tages to the attacker compared with other profiling attacks .
We summarize these observations in the followings points:
• the basic principle of the method is very simple, profil-
ing phase constitutes only the storing of data measured
in the memory (the attacker has to realize this in any
case),
• it is not necessary to prepare (calculate) templates, the
attacker can save time and memory,
• the k-NN approach is implemented by default in many
program environments, therefore it is no problem with
attack implementation,
• the success rate is comparable with the template attack,
the k-NN approach corresponds with the reduced TA
that does not take into account the covariance matrix,
• the attacker can use more interesting points compare
with TA where it is limited due to memory limitation
resulting from the covariance matrix,
• the k-NN does not include a learning phase compared
with other MLs, therefore the attacker can work more
efficiently (fast response to every changes related to the
power traces measured, number of interesting points,
size etc.).
We hope that this method will have continuance in pro-
filed power analysis attacks, because from the basic principle
follows a good assumption of the multivariate normal dis-
tribution classification (interesting points of power traces).
We demonstrated this assumption with simple example and
performed experiments.
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6. Appendix
Fig. 20. ROC analysis for individual bits of DS1.
